Charles Taylor and the (modern) self by Bogdan, Ciprian
www.ssoar.info
Charles Taylor and the (modern) self
Bogdan, Ciprian
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bogdan, C. (2007). Charles Taylor and the (modern) self. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 7(2),
423-445. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56092-0
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0
Charles Taylor and the (Modern) Self 423 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 




Introduction. Crises of Modern Identity 
 
It is usually said that thinking begins by questions. Our basic question is: What 
makes Charles Taylor different from other philosophers? A synthetic answer could 
be: Taylor is different because of his constant effort to define identity (especially mod-
ern identity). Surely, by this we don’t mean he is the only one who paid attention to 
this problem, rather he is among the few who places identity in the very core of our 
major philosophical problems – theory, practice and aesthetics, the three domains 
defining the modern imaginary are, in this view, all issues involving identity. 
We think, by placing Taylor’s vision in a larger context, that his works try to 
offer a solution to three major crises running through modernity, all related to our 
understanding of human being. What is all about? Before starting a more detailed 
description of this major shifts, we must have a relative agreement around the con-
cept of modernity: we trace modern world (of course, in a more symbolical manner) 
at the end of 18th century around a few important cultural figures such as Kant, 
Herder, or Hegel, having also in mind, as Taylor carefully does, the fact that this 
beginning is actually the result of previous cultural and structural developments – 
especially the changes occurred in 17th century due to the emergence of science and 
Protestantism1. Having this said, we can proceed in describing the major crises 
that, we believe, Taylor identifies, more or less in the same distinct manner as we 
present them, as covering the main problems of modern identity2. 
(a) The first crisis is directly related to the spectacular marching of scientific 
thought (since 17th century) to the centre of our ”social imaginary” and resulting in 
the spread of predominantly neutral or impersonal definitions of human being 
meaning a picture of the human self as a non-cultural product, a self envisioned as 
a bearer of some kind of pure consciousness sovereignly coordinating its ”innate 
thoughts” (Descartes), ”habits” (Locke, Hume), ”a priori categories” (Kant), ”sub-
jective rights”, or social functions. This self tends to be defined, as Taylor believes, 
through its ability to disengage itself from the cultural background in order to have 
                                                    
1 Jürgen HABERMAS in Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 
am Main, 1985, also traces modernity at the end of 18th century: Kant is the major turning point in 
this emergence, but only with Hegel modernity becomes aware of itself. 
2 Charles TAYLOR in Etica autenticităţii, Romanian transl. by Al. Moldovan, Editura Idea, 
Cluj, 2006, pp. 9-13, clearly identifies, for example, three major sources of discontentment that 
partially correspond to the description we offer about modern identity crises: the first one is 
originated in modern individualism that often sees itself as being self-referential, disconnected 
from community; the second one is located in the spread of the instrumental reasoning that 
transforms nature and humans in potential resources for technological or economic growth; the 
third one lies in politics and it has to do with the growing refusal of individuals to involve 
themselves in the public life.  
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a value-free, scientific look on the world. No wonder, therefore, that the faculty 
that this vision values the most is its self-consciousness, a faculty that allows the 
self to objectify not only its social and natural environment, but also itself. The 
paradox lies, following Heidegger, in the fact that this neutral definition of the self 
can provide two different perspectives on personal identity: on the one hand, the self 
is a detached observer of the world (in Kant’s case, for example, reason is not 
something we can trace anymore in God or nature, but in the human spirit itself), 
on the other hand, the self is only a small piece (object) in a social or natural system 
(the horrified social imaginary, for example, about human beings reduced to pure 
economic functions is already prepared by the cultural shift from a traditional-hi-
erarchical world to a scientific-uniform one in which people are caught up in a de-
terministic universal machinery). 
But, in order to make things clearer, we must answer the following questions: 
in what terms can we best describe the crisis brought by this new vision of the self? 
Moreover, this redefinition brings only problems, or we have also positive aspects 
that we should mention? Answering the latter, this development has had, un-
doubtedly, substantial positive effects: to mention only the subjective rights that al-
low individuals to emancipate from arbitrary social pressure and to open them-
selves towards universal forms of identification. But, on the other hand, this neu-
tral, non-cultural perspective has brought also a reductive image about human be-
ing: destroying the old world which could embrace the selves more or less coher-
ently and consistently in a hierarchical order – we must avoid, as Taylor does, a 
nostalgic look on these times –, the new world offers instead an atomistic alterna-
tive in which autonomous individuals try whether to assure some kind of fragile 
consensus (in the best scenario), or to impose their own truth against other indi-
viduals perceived as adversaries (in the worst scenario). We believe that perhaps 
the best formula which can describe the crisis of this neutral view is, following this 
time Peter Sloterdijk, the development of a cynical consciousness. Two hundred 
years after Kant’s famous Critique of Pure Reason, Sloterdijk writes his Critique of 
Cynical Reason. His aim is to uncover the huge gap created between the initial ide-
als of Enlightenment and its effective results. Thus, instead of a harmoniously de-
signed society formed by rational agents, we have ended up in a social world 
where everybody tries to survive through a disengaged or cynical reasoning: we 
don’t believe anymore, in order to give some examples of this cynicism, in ideals 
but we need them because we must pragmatically maintain some kind of individ-
ual or social order; or, we cannot trust anyone because we suspiciously and po-
lemically know that everybody tries to survive on our behalf1. 
(b) The second crisis, on the other hand, can be related to another perspective 
on human being: the self is not defined so much as a neutral agency, but, follow-
ing Taylor, more as an expressive, self-creative being. Having its origins in the Ro-
mantic movement, this view tries, in Taylor’s opinion, to connect the individual 
with nature and society: authenticity, as its best known ideal, represents a kind of 
expression that doesn’t sacrifice our natural desires in the name of reason or soci-
ety, on the contrary, it succeeds miraculously to combine all these elements (at 
least in the first moment, in the more enthusiastic Romantic writings). We are au-
thentic when we are able to express our natural needs in a highly personal 
                                                    
1 Peter SLOTERDIJK, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1983.  
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manner. The model of this view is not so much a disengaged, self-reflective rea-
son, but more an artistic impulse which brings to light some of its potential, crea-
tively transforming the self and its environment. If the first definition values 
mostly our capacity of being self-conscious, of detaching ourselves from arbitrary 
socio-cultural contexts, the second one emphasizes our capacity to provide a crea-
tive meaning to our life. We have the power to transform ourselves and our envi-
ronment. But where is the crisis in this scenario? The problems appear when, as 
Taylor notices, we radicalize the premises of this view, when we put too much 
emphasis on the individual. There are two options here: on the one hand, the indi-
vidual can be considered, in a Nietzschean manner, as a perfectly self-productive 
being that can denounce, in the name of his creative will to power, social solidar-
ity, he is strong enough to remake himself endlessly1; on the other hand, the indi-
vidual can be described, in an existentialist manner, as a being who is projected in 
a confusing cultural context, defined by the famous formula: ”everything is possi-
ble”, destined to make decisions on his own without any kind of certainty (social 
or metaphysical) about his choice. The name for this loss of meaning, due to the 
radical contingency of the modern world, is nihilism: no meaning can be secured 
by external references (God, society, nature etc.), all we have left are individuals 
capable (or not) to face this groundless situation. 
(c) The third crisis can be related to a more socio-cultural and also political defini-
tion of the self: in order to have a self, we have to be, as Taylor often emphasizes, 
part of a community and culture; moreover we have to participate in the political 
arena of this community because we are, as already said, primarily public beings. All 
these dimensions are, in Taylor’s view, unthinkable without language, the medium 
through which we can understand each other, developing some kind of consensus 
about our most important values regarding society and nature. Having all these in 
mind, the worst alternative we can imagine is, following Hegel, that of alienated indi-
viduals that are cut off from their community by a pathological retreat in their pri-
vate realms. The social consensus seems broken. But we can say that in fact there are 
two sides of this shift: the first one can be described, as Hegel does, in terms of an in-
dividual alienating himself from his community, discovering through negation 
(self-reflection) his own (incomplete) individuality; the second one can be defined by 
another kind of mutilation, one which happens in the middle of the community and 
takes the shape of pure conformism, the individual is part of the community but he 
lacks a voice of his own, following, more or less blindly, other people2. 
Having this larger perspective, our aim is from now on to follow the three 
lines of thought mentioned above through some of Charles Taylor’s works, also 
keeping in mind the fact that these lines are always related to each other and often 
mixed up: the view of the self as a disengaged being, for example, is at the root, as 
Taylor believes, of the rising of nihilism (this neutral perspective suspends any 
kind of strong distinctions which enables us to evaluate something as good or bad, 
noble or ignoble etc.) but also alienation (the atomism brought by disengagement 
erodes the political involvement required by the community). 
                                                    
1 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für alle und keinen, Alfred Kröner, 
Stuttgart, 1930. 
2 Kierkegaard, Nietzsche or Heidegger are among those who sharply criticize the leveling of 
the individual by anonymous social structures. 
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The Disengaged Self 
In his first book, Explanation of Behaviour, Taylor has already clearly pointed to-
ward his opponents: in this particular case, the behaviorism (developed by the 
American psychologist Skinner) which, during the 1950’s seemed to have some im-
pact on human sciences. Taylor reacts against behaviorism because of its reductive 
definition of human being: according to this, all we are can be reduced to the inter-
play of stimulus and responses; we are lacking any kind of inner depth, intention-
ality or complexity because our self is nothing but a reactive agency responding to 
external stimuli1. Drawing its inspiration from phenomenology (Husserl, Heideg-
ger and Merleau-Ponty), Taylor emphasizes, against an already criticized behav-
iorism (in the 1960’s, when Taylor published his book, behaviorism lost a great 
deal of its influence), that human action is intentional and not a simple reaction to 
stimuli. But, in fact, behaviorism is only a small and recent ramification of a larger 
and more profound development defining, since 17th century, Western culture. 
Taylor often uses the term ”naturalism” in order to capture this massive change. 
But how can we define it? Naturalism, as a product of scientific thinking, adopts a 
critical stance against all previous metaphysical or religious assumptions by por-
traying human being not predominantly as a creation of God or culture, but rather 
of nature (as science defines it: a region with exact and impersonal features)2. The 
self is a part of nature, but having one important advantage: the humans are the 
only objects/animals with consciousness3. Therefore, it is not a surprise that natu-
ralism emphasizes epistemology against morals, leaving out, in this way, the whole 
cultural background that in fact, thinks Taylor, shapes our identity4. But what are, 
more exactly, the features of naturalism? This view covers, under a neutral appear-
ance, several values that are (inconsistently) rejected as having a moral dimension: 
”disengagement”, ”autonomy” or ”freedom” are, for example, the main values im-
printed in the ”moral topography” of naturalism (despite its reluctance regarding 
such qualitative distinctions, it cannot avoid making them)5. 
Disengagement refers to the major shift, already present in Descartes’s and 
Locke’s writings, by which the self is portrayed as having the capacity to suspend 
the intentional character of its own mind (the intentionality is the faculty of our 
mind, relating us to something; we don’t think in general, as Husserl puts it, we 
rather think about specific objects): the self is therefore no longer viewed as some-
thing intimately related to its body, form of life or culture6, but, on the contrary, it 
is perceived as a pure consciousness ”suspending” everything outside itself and 
”examining” afterwards in a ”clear and distinct” (Descartes) manner its surround-
ings7. As Taylor briefly expresses it: ”Disengagement involves our going outside 
                                                    
1 Charles TAYLOR, Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1, Cambridge University 
Press, London, New York, 1985, p. 2.  
2 Ibidem, p. 2. 
3 Ibidem, p. 99. 
4 IDEM, Philosophical Arguments, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., London, 1997, 
p. 34.  
5 Hartmut ROSA, Identität und kulturelle Praxis. Politische Philosophie nach Charles Taylor, 
Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 1998, p. 345. 
6 Charles TAYLOR, Philosophical Arguments, cit., p. 62. 
7 IDEM, Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1992, p. 168.  
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the first-person stance and taking on board some theory, or at least some supposi-
tion, about how things work”1. Strangely enough, this flight outside the subjective 
view towards a third-person perspective is an inconsistent one because, as Taylor no-
tices (following one of Heidegger’s insights): ”Radical objectivity is only intelligi-
ble and accessible through radical subjectivity”2. But naturalism also goes hand in 
hand with a ”foundationalist” model concerned with reaching absolute certainty 
about the way reality reflects in our mind3. Therefore, by suspending intentional-
ity, we end up in radically different kind of relation with the world, a relation de-
fined mainly by mirroring things, as accurately as possible, in our mind. Rational-
ism and empiricism, despite their differences, agree both on this point: philosophy 
has to explain the basic model by which things are represented in our thought. Fur-
thermore, all these have great consequences for the way we describe language. 
Naturalism, foundationalism, representationalism etc., all consider language noth-
ing more than an instrument of the mind simply describing mental representations 
of neutral facts, therefore the language is reduced to a second hand product of a 
more basic structure of our consciousness (whether ideas, signs, or associations)4. 
Besides disengagement, naturalism also emphasizes, in an unprecedented 
manner, the autonomy and freedom of the self. We are by nature autonomous beings, 
outside the influence of any kind of cultural, political or religious authority5. Disen-
gagement of the mind and autonomy of the will generate a powerful mixture, pre-
paring the way for a vision centered predominantly on instrumental rationality: 
”Radical disengagement opens the prospect of self-remaking”6. The will’s main 
function is, from now on, to produce, as long as we are viewed as creatures of na-
ture, the maximum of individual happiness and pleasure7. The result is, therefore, 
quite obvious: disengagement and autonomy describe society, according to Taylor, 
in terms of an aggregate made out of individual atoms in which every single atom is 
portrayed as having the possibility, due to an impersonal reason and a instrumental 
will, to radically re-create itself and its environment. This view is the main source for 
those liberal ramifications (if we take in account the political tradition) that end up, 
as Taylor believes, in a highly damaging (because undermines people’s motivation 
for participating in public life) and inconsistent (because of an absurd radicalization 
of the idea of individual autonomy) self-referential individualism8. 
 
In his major work Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity, Taylor 
brings to light those Western values that have fundamentally contributed in shap-
ing modern identity. An unavoidable stop in this journey is Greek philosophy (es-
pecially Plato): Taylor identifies some of the ideas that, later on, will develop, 
through successive radicalizations, into the modern perspective of the self. Plato, 
for example, opens the prospect of modern self by his emphasis (criticizing in this 
way the Homeric view which allowed a fragmented self with unexpected flows of 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, pp. 162-163.  
2 Ibidem, 176. 
3 IDEM, Philosophical Arguments, cit., p. 40.  
4 Ibidem, p. 102. 
5 IDEM, Sources of the Self...cit., pp. 193-194.  
6 Ibidem, p. 170. 
7 Ibidem, p. 171. 
8
 IDEM, ”Two Theories of Modernity”, The Hastings Center Report 25, no. 2 (1995), 
http://www.questia.com, p. 18 (Accessed on 12 February 2007). 
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energy coming from gods) on the centering and unification of the self through the 
soul1. Even though, Plato argues, as in the case of the Greek dispute between indi-
vidual soul and polis (the space of political action), in favor of the soul, he still re-
mains very far from those theories embracing modern individualism based on the 
radical distinction between inner and outer2. The basic reason for this inadequacy is 
the fact that Plato identifies truth and values not in us, but in a hierarchically struc-
tured cosmic order3. The next stop in self’s journey is Augustin, the famous Christian 
theologian considered one of the most important representatives of the cultural syn-
thesis between Greek philosophy and Christian faith. Augustin is, according to Tay-
lor, the first one who brings to light ”radical reflexivity”, a new kind of thinking con-
cerned not so much with outside reality, but with the activity of thought itself4. The 
first-person perspective that tries to capture the way the world is for us has now en-
tered Western culture5. Therefore, Augustin must engage, in order to make this 
transformation, the radical idea of a sharp distinction between inner (soul) and 
outer (body, world)6. Furthermore, he is at the origin of another major shift: Au-
gustin manages to secure, against a powerful Socratic tradition in which passions 
are nothing but mere instruments for reason, an autonomous status for the will. It is 
not enough, from now on, to believe that knowing the truth/good is the equivalent 
of willing or wanting the truth/good. We can rationally have access to real truth (for 
Augustin: Christianity), but still rejecting, on the basis of a distorted will that sup-
ports a self-absorbed reflexivity, our relation to this truth (God). 
Plato and Augustin, despite their contribution in forging the vision of modern 
self, are still far, Taylor believes, from those premises that allowed Descartes to 
change so radically the way we see ourselves7. Even though Descartes continues 
some Augustinian ideas8, he introduces in the same time, under the pressure of sci-
entific discoveries from 17th century, a radicalization in both subjectivity and objec-
tivity, first and third-person perspective. What is all about? Contrary to Augustin, 
Descartes places our moral sources almost entirely in ourselves9. Ego cogito, cogito 
ergo sum means exactly the fact that the existence of the self is not related predomi-
nantly to a God-creator, but rather to our mind. Descartes’s universe denies the 
aristotelic teleology (in which reality is the result of a process of actualization fol-
lowing some predetermined telos or model) bringing instead a cold mechanistic 
image of the world. Our mind, sharply distinct from the body (the famous 
mind-body dualism), is from now on concerned mostly with having a correct rep-
resentation of things. The ”ideas” are not placed (as in Plato’s case) in a transcen-
dent realm, but in our spirit which, in the same time, produces the proper order of 
this ideas10. If the Platonic reason is looking for a ”substantive” reality lying outside 
ourselves, the new reason is, on the contrary, preoccupied with procedures that al-
low us to mirror nature in our mind11. Therefore, in order to attain objectivity, we 
                                                    
1 IDEM, Sources of the Self...cit., p. 118, 120. 
2 Ibidem, p. 121. 
3 Ibidem, p. 123. 
4 Ibidem, p. 130. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 Ibidem, p. 129. 
7 Ibidem, pp. 137-138. 
8 Ibidem p. 141.  
9 Ibidem, p. 144. 
10 Ibidem, pp. 144-145. 
11 Ibidem, p. 156. 
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necessarily have to go through a radical subjectivity which suspends everything 
outside it. But one step further, Descartes emphasizes, as never before, the major 
importance of the ”strength of will” based on an ”ethics of rational control”, the 
old ethic centered on ”generosity” is replaced by another one focusing on the ”dig-
nity” of human beings1. 
Another important figure, in this line of thought, is the famous empiricist John 
Locke who seems to be, at least in Taylor’s reading, close to the rationalist Des-
cartes. Locke is also impressed by the new scientific vocabulary and this impact 
can be easily traced in his ideas: he rejects the old Aristotelian order, and he also 
takes further the Cartesian disengagement by objectifying nature and the self (get-
ting out of the first-person perspective) and by suspending and examining all our 
previous beliefs that connected us to our body, culture, religion etc. As a good em-
piricist, he denies innate ideas, putting instead habits formed by experience: ”We 
are creatures of ultimately contingent connections: we have formed certain habits. 
But we can break from them and re-form them”2. Taylor describes Locke’s image 
of the self as a ”punctual self”: 
”The subject, who can make this kind of radical stance of disengagement 
to himself or herself with a view to remaking, is what I want to call a ’punc-
tual self’. To take this stance is to identify oneself with the power to objectify 
and remake, and by this act to distance oneself from all particular features 
which are objects of potential change”3. 
This self is ”extensionless”, in the way that it is nothing concrete, but exists 
only in its capacity to order things4. Locke identifies this self with consciousness, re-
jecting in the same time the idea of substance (material or immaterial). From a 
moral point of view, Locke portrays the self or the person as being a ”forensic 
term” based on the idea of punishment and reward. The person is a moral agent 
which assumes responsibility for his actions and seeks for future retributions. But 
this definition only continues, in Taylor’s view, the reification of the human self, an 
abstract being cut off from its intimate relation to its body, language or culture5. 
Taylor presents us, in his large attempt to make sense of the cultural genesis of 
the modern world, four major sources that shaped our understanding of the self: a) 
the disengaged self (Descartes, Locke); b) the idea of ”self-exploration” (Mon-
taigne); c) the emergence of ”personal commitment”; d) and the emphasis on ”or-
dinary life”6. The first two of them are forms of radical reflexivity (self-exploration 
anticipates the later expressivism emerging at the end of 18th century), meanwhile 
personal commitment is meant to designate the fact that after 17th century, due 
mostly to the Reform, the community is not something given that one instantly ac-
cepts, but it involves personal deliberation7. 
Another important cultural moment is ”radical Enlightenment” that further 
uses disengagement as a weapon against tradition (whether metaphysical or reli-
gious) reducing the self to a radically natural being. The radical Aufklärer sharply 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, pp. 152-153. 
2 Ibidem, p. 170. 
3 Ibidem, p. 171. 
4 Ibidem, p. 172. 
5 Ibidem, p. 173. 
6 Ibidem, p. 211. 
7 Ibidem, pp. 193-195. 
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argues that we have to reject any kind of cosmological order and we should in-
stead simply focus on our nature in order to understand it and control it. The ethic 
consistent with this kind of thought is a utilitarian one: we are natural creatures 
seeking happiness and pleasure and avoiding pain. Therefore, Enlightenment 
rejects ”constitutive goods” in the name of ”life goods” (values oriented towards ordi-
nary life) such as: a) the ideal of a ”self-responsible reason”; b) ”the ordinary fulfill-
ments that we seek by nature” (happiness, work, family); c) the ideal of ”universal 
and impartial benevolence”1. But Enlightenment falls into a ”pragmatic contradic-
tion” (as, in fact, any instrumental reasoning) when, on the one hand, it rejects any 
kind of ”strong evaluation” (the belief that there are goals that ”are incommensur-
able with our other desires and purposes”)2 and, on the other hand, it implicitly as-
sumes some strong values as those mentioned above. 
Kant reacts, despite his close ties with the Aufklärung, against its two-sided, re-
ductive anthropology: the first side focuses on human subjectivity by defining the 
self in relation to scientific objectivity, meanwhile the second one concentrates on 
the idea that human beings are essentially products of nature3. Kant is highly criti-
cal to this portrayal of man as natural being defined by desire and by its (small) 
place in a deterministic universe. The individual has, in such an asphyxiating uni-
verse, no freedom and, therefore, no dignity. Taylor, when talking about Kant, 
seems to have a relatively ambivalent attitude: he admires, on the one hand, the 
above mentioned reaction of Kant to radical Enlightenment and also his argument 
against Hume remarkably anticipating the phenomenological idea of intentional-
ity4, but, on the other hand, he rejects Kant because of his culture-neutral definition 
of the self. Kant is at the origin of another great radicalization of self’s understand-
ing, brilliantly managing to offer an almost perfect self-referential picture of man: 
all we need, says Kant, is produced in us, in our reason that secures our theoretical, 
practical and artistic judgments. That is why Taylor places Kant in a tradition 
(starting with Descartes) that he wants to avoid opting instead for the other great 
reaction to the cold-hearted radical Enlightenment: expressivism or Romanticism. 
The disengaged understanding of the self, despite the critics, becomes the 
dominant trend in modern culture. Sociology, psychology, and even psychoanaly-
sis are all different branches of the same tree rooted in the 17th century revolution 
of science5. This scientific approach defines a person as a being having conscious-
ness, consciousness meaning here the capacity to frame our representations of ex-
ternal objects6. According to this view, the human mind has all the neutral ingre-
dients of a machine; the only thing that distinguishes humans from computers is 
the fact that humans possess consciousness7. Therefore, language is also reduced 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, pp. 321-322. 
2 Ibidem, p. 332. 
3 IDEM, Hegel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1975, p. 10. 
4 Taylor in Philosophical Arguments, cit., p. 71, notices that Kant argues against Hume by 
saying that our mind cannot be the product of individual sensations because these have to be 
recognized as being sensations, therefore, it has to be something that preexists these bits of 
information and coordinates them in a coherent and consistent manner. This capacity will later be 
called (by Husserl) intentionality and will involve the relation of the mind and its objects by 
reference to a cultural background.  
5 Charles TAYLOR, Sources of the Self...cit., pp. 33-34. 
6 IDEM, Human Agency and Language…cit., p. 98. 
7 Ibidem. 
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to the function of designating, as accurately as possible, external reality. The HLC 
(from Hobbes, Locke and Condillac) theory of language, as Taylor with an ironic 
touch names it, closely follows the pattern of a scientific model in which language 
is nothing but a humble and transparent instrument of our underneath represen-
tations free from any kind of subjective distortion (human intentionality, emo-
tions, desires etc.)1. 
Another symptom related to our instrumental understanding can be traced in 
the concept of ”negative liberty” (a famous formula of Isaiah Berlin, Taylor’s pro-
fessor at Oxford in his early years) which hides, in a subtle manner, our tendency 
to adopt a culture-neutral and value-free perspective. Taylor notices (continuing a 
long political tradition) that negative liberty opposes ”positive liberty”: the first 
one goes from the assumption that human being is free as long as it has no external 
obstacles that limit its freedom, the emphasis here is on possibility and less on our 
acts to reach freedom; the second one is rather preoccupied with the way we strug-
gle, as cultural beings, in order to become free by overcoming our internal (motiva-
tional) and external obstacles2. Negative liberty (one of the main formulas of liber-
alism) is, in fact, indebted to naturalism because it makes no strong distinctions be-
tween its obstacles, these are all the same, freedom exists only when we overcome 
every obstacle (that’s why the State, for example, in this liberal reading, must not 
actively intervene in society, but it must only neutrally prevent disorder)3. Society 
follows the image of nature: values/objects are exposed to a neutral observation 
without qualitative distinctions that would jeopardize this perfect uniformity. 
Positive liberty, on the other hand, assumes a cultural background in which some 
obstacles are more important to overcome than others. It’s obvious, in this case, 
Taylor’s political background as a communitarian that reacts against a liberalism 
that unrealistically places human being in empty contexts that are filled only after-
wards with ideas/values created ex nihilo by every individual. 
But Taylor’s critique is pointed not only against those (neo)liberal thinkers 
blind to cultural arguments, but also against more social sensitive thinkers such as, 
for example, Habermas. Taylor admires at Habermas the great emphasis on com-
munication and intersubjectively developing identity, but on the other hand rejects 
Habermas’s position on the ground that only further continues a formal-proce-
dural approach that comes from utilitarians and Kant4. The ideal of ”undistorted 
communication” (Habermas’s famous formula) is not necessarily a solution to the 
problem of motivating people in order to involve themselves actively in public life 
and also to have an authentic personal existence. Habermas presents his theory as 
being context-free, blind to cultural differences, but, says Taylor, the ideal of undis-
torted communication already presupposes, by emphasizing it against other ideals, 
some kind of previous strong evaluation. Therefore, this universal-formal ideal is 
an abstract theory (and Habermas is the only individual he believes in it) as long as 
this ideal is not internalized by specific individuals living in a culture in order to 
motivate them towards action5. 
                                                    
1 IDEM, Philosophical Arguments, cit., p. 102. 
2 IDEM, Negative Freiheit? Zur Kritik des neuzeitlichen Individualismus, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1992, pp. 121-122. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 126-128. 
4 IDEM, Sources of the Self...cit., p. 86.  
5 Ibidem, p. 88. 
432 CIPRIAN BOGDAN 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 
Self-interpreting Animals.  
The Ideal of Authenticity 
Taylor’s effort to offer an alternative to the all pervasive naturalism takes the 
form of two philosophical approaches that in a way can sum up his vision: firstly, 
Taylor wants to elaborate a philosophical anthropology (for example, in Human Agency 
and Language) that should clarify the universal possibilities that define the concept of 
person; secondly, he attempts, in order to sustain the first project, to define modern self 
(in the already mentioned Sources of the Self) by going back in Western culture and 
bringing to light those values that constitute the horizon of our present understand-
ing of the self1. Following these two dynamics we can also understand the rather 
minor difference between self and identity: the concept of the self predominantly 
covers a universal meaning designating those conditions that make possible self-un-
derstanding; identity, on the other hand, has a more specific meaning describing 
rather those particular actualizations of the self (we could say that we have only one 
self but with several identities: professor, parent, Romanian etc.)2. 
Reacting to the impersonal approaches of identity, Taylor replaces the famous 
Kantian question: ”What is the man?” with a more personal one: ”Who am I?”. The 
third-person perspective forgets, according to Taylor, about a fundamental feature 
of the self or person: the notion of ”self-understanding” meaning here not only that 
we possess a certain knowledge of ourselves, but, more profoundly, that we are 
partially constituted by this understanding. Going deeper, self-understanding em-
bodies our perception about us relating it to a background of strong evaluation. 
Being a person or a self, says Taylor, means to exist in a space defined by qualita-
tive distinctions, that is, a space that opens the self towards fundamental questions 
that he partially tries and manages to answer3. Taylor introduces here the famous 
formula of human beings as ”self-interpreting animals”. This 20th century’s major 
thesis (having its origin in the Romanticism) developed by Dilthey, Heidegger, 
Gadamer and even Habermas replaces the old formula of man as ”animal rationale” 
because of its excessively intellectualistic view4. By adopting this anthropological 
reading, we necessarily accept the idea that human being cannot be described re-
ductively as an object. Naturalism understands object as an entity existing outside 
our interpretations, a person, on the other hand, exists only as self-interpretation5. 
The naturalist emphasis on abstract consciousness objectifying its body and the 
natural world are now replaced with the idea of an engaged self intimately accept-
ing its culture (self-interpreting) and its own body (animal). Furthermore, Taylor 
tries to connect, against the naturalist way of thinking, understanding or reason 
with emotions and language6. Taylor’s hypothesis regarding our emotions rejects 
the idea of some pure emotions not incorporating an implicit understanding of the 
meaning that things have for us (their value for us) and also not intentionally refer-
ring to a particular object. ”Human life is never without interpreted feelings; the 
                                                    
1 Hartmut ROSA, Identität und kulturelle Praxis...cit., p. 83. 
2 Ibidem, p. 84. 
3 Charles TAYLOR, Human Agency and Language…cit., p. 3. 
4 Ibidem, p. 45. 
5 Ibidem, p. 75. 
6 Ibidem, p. 61.  
Charles Taylor and the (Modern) Self 433 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 
interpretation is constitutive to the feeling.”1 Taylor introduces the concept of ”im-
port” in order to make things more clear: an import can be defined as a way by 
which something can be relevant or important for our desires, purposes, aspira-
tions, or our feelings2. We cannot adopt a purely impersonal stance towards reality 
because we are part of a world saturated with cultural values, every object means 
being felt/interpreted/valued by a subject in a particular context according to 
some background that he incorporated. 
Self-interpreting animal also radically redefines our relationship with language. 
Taylor, following the expressivist tradition and phenomenology (especially Hei-
degger and Gadamer), considers language not as a medium helping in the process 
of mirroring reality in our mind, but the most important way to define ourselves. 
Language means expression and not description. For Taylor, expression is not crea-
tion ex nihilo: human being is not born in paradise in order to be the first which 
names the things around it, but rather it is a historical-cultural being that is pro-
jected in a world already having its meanings. Therefore ”expression partakes of 
both finding and making”3. On the one hand, every articulation brings to light some 
of the implicit interpretation lying in cultural horizon but, on the other hand, every 
interpretation re-creates, on the basis of an irreducible difference inscribed in every 
individual, this background. The whole of culture is always partially brought to 
light, being filtered by a personal interpretation. Moreover, language has the ca-
pacity (replacing, in this way, the reign of abstract consciousness) to assure the 
unity and continuity of the self through personal narrative. Identity is not reducible 
only to the question of ”who we are now?”, but also to ”what we are going to be?” 
and to ”what we were?”. Our personal narrative manages to bring, despite the 
changes, these temporal dimensions together by describing life as a ”quest” (Mac-
Intyre), as a story with an open end that progressively unfolds itself. Moreover, 
our life-history filtered by our personal narrative gives us the possibility to relate 
ourselves to the whole of our existence, unifying all the fragments of our life in a 
relatively consistent story4. 
Taylor, by positing himself in the expressivist line of thought, acknowledges 
the most important value of this cultural tradition: the ideal of authenticity. If auton-
omy relates to the impersonal approach initiated by Descartes, meaning, stricto 
sensu to give our own law, authenticity further continues this tendency towards in-
ternalization by focusing, this time, on the ideal of being in harmony with our-
selves, with our own natural desires and needs5. Taylor speaks about the ideal or 
ethics of authenticity in order to demonstrate the strong connection between mor-
als and artistic impulses (our desires that must be creatively expressed). We are, 
despite our personal originality, social creatures. Taylor offers an interesting solu-
tion to the relationship between our natural dimension (needs, desires), on the one 
hand, and our socio-moral one (ideals, values), on the other hand, succeeding in a 
way to avoid the old and dead-end conflictive distinction between nature and cul-
ture. There is no pure nature that simply lies outside our cultural interpretations, 
but only a nature that is absorbed by society through early socialization. Children 
are, for example, educated by family and society in order to incorporate the values 
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of the present cultural horizon. At this stage, children internalize non-reflectively 
these values, shaping in this way their nature, that is, their needs and desires (we 
know that emotions are necessarily framed by an already existing cultural inter-
pretation); later on, as adults, human beings are in the position to reflectively claim 
authenticity as a way of being, therefore, in harmony with their firstly socialized 
nature1. To sum up, Taylor wants to offer a common ground to the classical oppo-
sitions between individual/society (individual cannot exist outside society and 
culture) or nature/culture (neither of them can be imagined without the other). 
 
Taylor traces along the tradition of a disengaged self initiated by the cold ra-
tionalist Descartes, another tradition initiated this time by the warm-hearted 
French writer Montaigne (17th century). Taylor names this new ramification of 
Western culture ”self-exploration”. If Descartes looks for some absolute point secur-
ing our knowledge of the world, Montaigne has only but doubts about the possi-
bility we can perfectly understand ourselves. He becomes insecure from the mo-
ment he sits at his table trying to write about himself and discovering that his life is 
nothing but a changing flux in which all he can do is to maintain some kind of bal-
ance. Montaigne ends up, in this way, not in some impersonal point of view from 
where he has privileged access to the world, but in a profoundly first-person per-
spective from where the self is nothing but individual fragments put together 
through self-exploration and expression in a never complete personal story. Mon-
taigne is, therefore, the source of another type of individualism than the one origi-
nating in Descartes, an individualism fully developing in Romantic expressivism 
and in all those modern trends praising the authenticity of autobiography2. 
At the end of the 18th century there are signs of another important cultural shift. 
The French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau dethrones, in his attempt to fight 
radical Enlightenment, reason for our sentiments, also enlarging our ”inner voice” 
(radical subjectivity) by which he means that we are able to know only from inside 
us (and not from some external point) what nature considers being important3. Rous-
seau rejects all the Enlightenment’s optimistic narratives about progress, opting in-
stead for a return to nature: society only artificially multiplies our needs and our de-
pendence on other people. Rousseau believes, therefore, that being authentic is the 
equivalent of being moral (of not depending on the image that others project on us). 
But the major revolution, according to Taylor, lies in the works of German phi-
losopher Herder. Well known as the father of nationalism (even though this label 
is not entirely an accurate one), he can also be considered as the father of the ex-
pressivist individualism4. If ”dignity” progressively becomes the major value of 
that modern individualism (universal and egalitarian) coming from Descartes and 
Kant, ”authenticity” is the ideal, emerging with Herder, of an expressivist indi-
vidualism. Herder critically replaces the old vision according to which the shape of 
identity is the result of our position in a hierarchical society with another vision 
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praising our natural differences as individuals (the individual is the measure of 
things, according to Herder). Authenticity means, therefore, that our way of being 
is not socially but rather internally generated1. Reacting also against Enlightenment 
and its artificially producing distinctions (such as: individual/society or culture; 
reason/sensitivity; mind/body etc.), Herder proposes instead, according to Taylor, 
a new kind of unity originated in the expressive work of art: 
”Human life was seen as having a unity rather analogous of a work of 
art, where every part or aspect only found its proper meaning in relation to 
all others. Human life unfolded from some central core – a guiding theme or 
inspiration – or should do so, if it were not so often blocked or distorted.” 
Moreover, ”the image of expression was central to this view not just in that it 
provided the model for the unity of human life, but also in that men reached 
their highest fulfillment in expressive activity”2. 
For Herder there is no abstract thinking, only language-dependent reflexivity. 
Therefore, Herder introduces a new kind of self-consciousness producing a synthesis 
between being and meaning (one of the Enlightenment’s rigid distinctions), or be-
tween Aristotle’s teleology and the modern idea of ”self-defining subjectivity”: the 
man as a conscious being means recognizing his life as a real expression of what he 
potentially is (Herder adopts here the attitude of an artist recognizing himself in 
his creation)3. Moreover, Herder, by admitting the central place of language in cul-
tural (national) identity, places human being in a community, trying in this way to 
overcome a tension that haunted his time: that between the idealized ancient Greek 
community and the individual freedom (praised by Enlightenment)4. 
But the philosopher who, according to Taylor, realizes in the most spectacular 
manner the above mentioned synthesizes is Hegel. The German thinker seems to 
be facing two alternatives popular in Germany at the beginning of 19th century: the 
alternative offered by the Kantian philosophy focusing on individual autonomy 
based on rationality and the one represented by expressivism (Herder and the fol-
lowing Romantics: Schlegel, Novalis etc.) praising enthusiastically the unity of 
man with inner/outer nature and society5. Hegel’s philosophy of mind offers, ac-
cording to Taylor, two major ideas in which we can sense both Kant and the Ro-
mantics: the first idea is that of an embodied subject who, as animal rationale, is de-
termined (following Kant) by the activity of thinking and also by the fact that, as an 
expressivist being, its thinking is a medium for the life’s-process or, as we discover 
at the end of the Phenomenology of the Mind, the all pervasive Absolute Spirit6. 
Therefore, the spiritual life of the subject is an embodied one in the sense that it is 
the life of a thinking living being and also that its thinking exists only as expres-
sion7. Hegel’s second major idea, on the other hand, is that reflexive consciousness 
manages to transform activity: if, according to Hegel, at first we are not aware of 
our biological and cultural dimensions, later on, as we grow (as history progresses), 
we can reach perfect self-consciousness8. This fully developed consciousness means 
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that we realize that individual actions are rather collective ones (we are essentially 
members of a historically determined society) and, even more radically, we realize 
that as individuals we are defined as vehicles of an Absolute Spirit1. According to 
his dialectical movement based on successive negations, Hegel thinks of his system 
as the historical synthesis between the Kantian moment and the Romantic one: all 
these moments prove to be nothing but late expressions of an Absolute Spirit that 
manifests itself in history and comes to self-consciousness through nothing else 
than Hegel’s philosophy. 
Another important source of inspiration for Taylor’s view is the work of Mar-
tin Heidegger. In an article about Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Taylor thinks that 
one of their most important contributions in defining human identity is the idea of 
an ”engaged” subject2. Heidegger can talk about ”finitude” only because he places 
his Dasein (human being) in the limits created by a world, body or language that 
precede him3; the self cannot decide whether to accept these limits or not (natural-
ist thinking makes us to unrealistically think that we can decide as individuals 
about everything that concerns us), but rather it has been thrown in their horizon 
by the ”Being” itself. Dasein must accept its cultural horizon and become authentic 
by focusing, while taking in consideration the limit posed by its inevitable death, 
on those possibilities that prove to be the most creative ones4. 
If Herder, Hegel or Heidegger all provide, with relatively minor adjustments, 
valuable ideas for a deep rethinking of human identity against the dominant scien-
tific discourse, there are also other cultural figures that, even though they are re-
lated to expressivism, tend to develop a nihilistic perspective close at some point to 
naturalism. Nietzsche is perhaps one of the major challenges in this case. Taylor 
admits that Nietzsche’s affirmation of life (”Ja-sagen”) is not possible without the 
resources provided by Romantic expressivism (the vision of the unity between 
man and nature)5. Moreover, Nietzsche is, we could say, one of the most convinc-
ing advocates of authenticity providing, as Taylor notices in comparing him with 
his postmodernist followers, at least the ideal of the ”Übermensch”6. But Taylor 
thinks, attacking Nietzsche with his own arguments that the creator of Zarathustra 
ends up exactly as his enemies: a nihilist. Nietzsche portrayals, partially following 
Schopenhauer in criticizing naive Romanticism, nature as an amoral force in which 
wills blindly clash without any kind of cosmic coordination that would integrate 
them in a harmonious plan. With Nietzsche Romanticism loses its innocence, 
biology comes in, brutally replacing old cosmic visions7. But Nietzsche’s nihilism 
manifests itself most vividly in his rejection of the cultural background that pro-
vides our values: this background is tainted with the principles of a moral of slaves 
that weakens, through the ideas of benevolence or solidarity, the strong and 
creative individual8. This individual needs no such background that limits his crea-
tivity; instead he is able to radically recreate his life according to his own will to 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, p. 93. 
2 IDEM, Philosophical Arguments, cit., pp. 61-62. 
3 Ibidem, p. 63. 
4 Martin HEIDEGGER, Fiinţă şi timp, Romanian transl. by G. Liiceanu and C. Cioabă, Editura 
Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 350.  
5 Charles TAYLOR, Sources of the Self...cit., p. 343. 
6 Ibidem, p. 102. 
7 Ibidem, p. 462. 
8 Ibidem, p. 343. 
Charles Taylor and the (Modern) Self 437 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 
power. Values are, in this scenario, nothing but mere instruments in the hands of a 
will that wants only to manifest itself creatively. 
Taylor believes that, unfortunately, Nietzsche’s nihilistic vision has become 
popular, in present days, because of the so called postmodernists: Derrida, Fou-
cault, or Lyotard. Romanticism agrees about the fact that expression makes things 
to be ”brought-to-light” (there is always a cultural background that provides our 
meanings), but rejecting the idea of a pure order not involving manifestation; this 
premise is then radicalized and bringing-to-light becomes ”bringing-about” (there 
is no cultural background providing our meanings, but only artificial creation)1. It 
opens us at least two possibilities: we can say, as Nietzsche does, that the strong in-
dividual is his life’s only creator, or we can say, following this time postmodernist 
thinking, that creativity is the product not of a subject, but of the language itself 
(language, in a strange formula, speaks the subject) 2. 
Cultural Background and Habitus 
Those theories which disconnect personal authenticity from cultural back-
ground are, in Taylor’s vision, as dangerous as those having their source in natu-
ralism: both move back and forwards between personal originality (Übermensch) or 
radical subjectivity (ego cogito) and impersonal instances (the language that speaks 
us) or radical objectivity (laws of nature). There is no, it seems, buffer zone that 
could prevent these excessive statements. But in fact, thinks Taylor, the world as a 
reality always culturally interpreted can give us the support for a more accurate 
perspective on our self: there is always an underlying relative consensus that later 
opens us, as we become more aware about this background, the possibility to see 
more clearly its tensions and bring, if necessary, changes according to our personal 
view about these things. Our background can secure some kind of consensus be-
cause we, as engaged human beings, acquire a socially transmitted horizon allow-
ing us to make sense of our experiences and of the things around us3. Disengage-
ment and (self-referential) authenticity are possible only by relating them to this 
large implicit/explicit cultural background against which these in fact react. Indi-
vidualism is a cultural product and not something that transcends culture. We are, 
therefore, beings who are thrown (in order to use Heidegger’s language) in the 
world, meaning also in history, language or in some moral space. The word ”cul-
ture” can in fact, in close resonance with anthropology, bring all these together: 
”I am evoking the picture of a plurality of human cultures, each of which 
has a language and a set of practices that define specific understandings of per-
sonhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and 
vices, and the like. These languages are often mutually untranslatable”4. 
Cultures are, in a way, large-scale languages because only language can help 
us to make sense of our social goods, but also of the property and power relations. 
Extending language at such proportions means also that language is not reducible, 
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according to Taylor, only to reflective linguistic articulation; there are also non-lin-
guistic languages (for example, body-language communicating through gestures, 
clothes etc., information about someone’s social background) that underlie our 
non-reflective practices1. Actually, linguistic articulation, in the sense of a reflective 
and explicit process of clarification, is predetermined by the background of our im-
plicit practices. At first we go through a non-reflective process of internaliza-
tion/embodiment of cultural values, only afterwards being able to more fully un-
derstand their meanings. Taylor names, following the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu, this first-order socialization: ”habitus” (”values made flesh”)2. Habitus 
contains, therefore, our implicit knowledge of the world visible in our actions and 
that is socially transmitted from early stages. Linguistic articulations are (with 
some exceptions) attempts to bring to light this underlying knowledge, but never 
succeeding to reach absolute transparency: we manage only partially to express 
those cultural meanings incorporated in us as habitus. Moreover, expressing this 
background is not something that resembles perfect reproduction of an underlying 
reality, rather every expression means finding and creating: things partially change 
with every articulation of them. 
Human beings, as self-interpreting animals, possess the capacity to use lan-
guage in naming things which, in a deeper and radical manner, means to evaluate 
them ”as things worth pursuing”3. Language is, therefore, the equivalent of produc-
ing distinctions: good/bad, important/trivial etc. Because of the language some 
things are more important than others. Taylor defines personal identity in direct 
relation to this capacity to live in a moral space: 
”What this brings to light is the essential link between identity and a kind 
of orientation. To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in 
which questions arise what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, 
what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary”4. 
Moreover, ”we are living beings, says Taylor, with these organs quite in-
dependently of our self-understandings or –interpretations, or the meanings 
things have for us. But we are only selves insofar as we move in a certain 
space of questions, as we seek and find an orientation to the good”5. 
Following Harry Frankfurt, Taylor believes that human beings are the only be-
ings having ”second-order volitions”: a person is not just a subject of desires, 
choices or deliberation (first-order volitions), but more profoundly a subject of 
wanting to be moved by first-order desires. Humans are, according to Frankfurt, 
the only beings capable of ”reflective self-evaluation” meaning that we can sus-
pend our ideals and goals in order to find an answer to a radical question such as: 
”Do I really want to be what I now am?”6. Taylor goes further and identifies two 
kinds of evaluation: the first is called ”weak” because it covers trivial and contin-
gent desires and the process of choosing between them (we can ask, for example: 
”Do I want to have chocolate or ice-cream?”), this kind of evaluation is directly 
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linked to the naturalist view of a neutral world with no qualitative distinctions in-
volved; the second is ”strong” evaluation because it means dealing with substantive 
ideals that does not involve choosing between alternatives, I already know that one 
of them is more valuable than the other because I use a ”contrastive language”. If 
the ”weak evaluator” goes from the fact that every desire has the same meaning 
for us, the ”strong evaluator” knows that we have already evaluated our desires, 
some of them (honesty or courage etc.) being more valuable than others (to look 
good, to be admired etc.)1. Therefore, weak evaluation can be resembled with 
Harry Frankfurt’s first-order volitions and the strong evaluation with second-order 
volitions2. In this sense, according to Taylor, only the strong evaluator has some-
thing we can call ”depth” because he is not preoccupied with mere calculation be-
tween alternatives (as the weak evaluator), but rather with the development of a 
contrastive vocabulary that he must carefully articulate3. 
Taylor defines (arguing in this way with those dominant modern trends that 
exclude the content of our ideals, reducing moral to neutral procedures that we must 
follow in order to prevent evil) the ”Good” that structures moral space as follows: 
”I have been speaking of the good in these pages, or sometimes of 
strong good, meaning whatever is picked out as incomparably higher in a 
qualitative distinction. It can be some action, or motive, or style of life, which 
is seen qualitatively superior. ’Good’ is used here in a highly general sense, 
designating anything considered valuable, worthy, admirable, of whatever 
kind or category.”4 
But goods don’t have the same status. Taylor identifies actually three major 
goods (sometimes confusingly close to each other): the first ones and also the least 
valuable in this hierarchy are ”life goods”. These are considered to be the goals and 
ideals that humans bring to light in order to define a ”good life”, as the ideal of an 
autonomous reason, or the ideal of expressive fulfillment5. The second ones and 
also the most valuable in Taylor’s view are ”hypergoods”: ”Goods which not only 
are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from 
which these must be weighed, judged, decided about”6, as following God or 
searching justice. Finally, the third goods are ”constitutive goods”: ”The constitutive 
good is a moral source, in the sense I want to use this term here: that is, it is a 
something the love of which empowers us to do and to be good”7. A constitutive 
good can be considered the Platonic order of being, or the later Christian God that 
replaced, in a way, Plato’s Good. 
If life goods refer to human ideals, hypergoods and constitutive goods represent 
something that transcend humans, are goods in themselves having a cultural back-
ground and people that believe in them. But hypergoods and constitutive goods 
seem sometimes almost undistinguishable. Hartmut Rosa proposed, in order to 
make things more clear, two kind of arguments: the first is a functional one: hyper-
goods must order and coordinate life, constitutive goods are, on the other hand, 
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”moral sources”; the second argument is an ontological one: hypergoods have a supe-
rior ontological status because it is a value that subjects recognize as having impor-
tance for their lives, constitutive goods, on the other hand, can be valuable (as part of 
the implicit cultural background) without being recognized as such by humans1. 
The identity of the self is made out, according to Taylor, of two things closely 
related to each other: the values, or goods that allow us to select those things that 
matter to us in order to have a fulfilling life, but also our belonging to a cultural 
community2. We usually identify ourselves with some kind of community or com-
munities. Having a bi-cultural background, Taylor is well aware about the impor-
tance of culture and community and also about the need to be recognized by others 
in order to become a harmonious person. Our craving for recognition is something 
present in us from the early stages of our lives: we define ourselves, and here Tay-
lor follows George Mead, in ”webs of interlocution” meaning the fact that we un-
derstand ourselves at first through the linguistics interchanges with our parents or 
”significant others”3. Later on, we become able to consciously define our identity, 
but still never in isolation: discovering our identity means therefore that I negotiate 
it through a dialogue, partially open, partially internal with other people4. Even in 
solitude, I am not simply cut off from the rest of the world, but I continue, because 
of my linguistic nature, my dialogue with those who matter for me. Therefore, rec-
ognition, as something related to our basic need for face-to-face relationships, is 
rooted, according to Taylor’s rather ambiguous definition, almost in our biological 
nature, in our ontogenetics5. Having such an anthropological importance, the logi-
cal consequence of it seems quite obvious: not having recognition can be disastrous 
for people’s identity. The concept directly related to this crisis is ”alienation”, a term 
Taylor adopts from Hegel’s vocabulary. But we believe that Taylor seems to admit 
the existence of two kinds of sources generating alienation: on the one hand, a per-
son alienates itself when, following the path of atomist individualism common to 
liberal thinking, refuses to involve itself in public life by simply retreating in its 
private realm; on the other hand, alienation also comes when the community rejects 
those members who are too different according to the standards of common-sense 
normality. Regarding this second case, Taylor wrote a famous text on multicultural-
ism: The Politics of Recognition trying to offer a solution to the problem of how can 
we integrate people from other cultural backgrounds without causing them psy-
chological traumas by our refusal to recognize their basic cultural identity. Taylor 
believes there are two different answers to the problem of ”equal recognition”. The 
first one, the politics of universalism, belongs to classical liberalism; this option guar-
antees the equal dignity of every individual in front of a universal, neutral law. The 
second answer, the politics of difference, is based on the equal respect of those differ-
ent from us and it is rooted in another kind of liberalism coming from Hegel and rec-
ognizing the basic need for cultural identity6. Taylor maintains, therefore, that alien-
ation cannot be overcome with the help of the liberal idea of a neutral State (States are 
in fact culturally biased, all we have to do is to maintain a cultural equilibrium in the 
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coordination of the State) or with the strong distinction between public and private. 
Regarding the last point, Taylor thinks we should have the right, because of our so-
cial and expressive nature, to freely express our identities in public without casting 
them (schizophrenically) to the intimacy of our private world. 
 
Historically speaking, the old pattern of securing a socio-cultural consensus is 
represented, according to Taylor’s narrative, by a hierarchical order usually hav-
ing a strong religious and metaphysical background as in the case of Greek cul-
ture and, later, Christianity. The beginnings of modernity (17th century) radically 
question this cosmological pattern. There are two important moments in this 
change: the first is the emergence of what Taylor names the idea of a ”personal 
commitment” having its origin in the Reform and meaning the necessity of a con-
sciously made personal agreement in order to build a community (at first, a Chris-
tian community). Previously, the social consensus was established by a commu-
nity accepted as being something natural, but in 17th century emerges another 
view saying that individuals are more basic than community and that in fact, as in 
the case of contractualist theories anticipating liberalism, every community is the 
product of a contract between rational and free agents1. Community is not any-
more a given, or a substance, but something created. The second moment of the 
above mentioned change is the focus on ”ordinary life”, or, as Taylor understands 
it, the two human dimensions involved in it: ”production” (work) and ”reproduc-
tion” (sexuality, marriage, family)2. The modern sensitivity reacts against the cos-
mological and social hierarchy emphasizing instead ordinary processes. Later on, 
the Enlightenment radicalizes this anti-hierarchical view and defines human be-
ings in a utilitarian manner as natural beings seeking for physical pleasure3. Ro-
manticism, on the other hand, draws a different image, even though it inherits the 
spirit of the changes mentioned above: humans are definable only by harmoni-
ously placing them in a natural and cultural order, but, in contrast with the old hi-
erarchy, nature and culture are something that can be expressed only through in-
dividuals. Nature is not so much a cosmic order, but more the way it ”resonates” 
in us4. One step further, Hegel is the one who makes a spectacular synthesis be-
tween Enlightenment and Romanticism offering his own version of the relation-
ship between individual and his environment. Taylor notices the powerful Hege-
lian concept of ”Sittlichkeit” (”ethical substance”) meaning the set of obligations 
we have to follow in order to preserve a society based on Idea (Absolute Spirit). 
Sittlichkeit has a concrete meaning, it refers to the moral obligations we have in a 
specific community to which we belong, therefore, this concept offers Hegel the 
semantic connotation needed in order to express the unity between Sollen (duty) 
and Sein (being) avoiding in this way the Kantian ”Moralität” based on a gap be-
tween the formal laws of morality and our sensual nature5. According to Taylor, 
in Hegel’s philosophy: 
”The State or the community has a higher life; its parts are related as the 
parts of an organism. Thus the individual is not serving an end separate from 
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him; rather he is serving a larger goal which is the ground of his identity, for 
he only is the individual he is in this larger life”1. 
This close relation with community is menaced by the danger of alienation: 
”This comes about when the public experience of my society ceases to have any 
meaning for me”2. But community is based, according to Hegel, on another impor-
tant social process: recognition. Taylor’s account regarding this concept identifies it 
with the emergence of modern world: the decay of the old value of ”honour”, 
based on social hierarchy (honour is valuable because not everybody possesses it), 
by its replacement with the egalitarian and democratic value of ”dignity” and also 
the newly born ideal of authenticity focusing on subjectivity, all these generate a 
state of all pervasive insecurity3. Identity and recognition are something we reflect 
upon, massively more than we did before, because from now on these are not 
something socially given: as moderns, we have to struggle both for the identity we 
want to express and for the underlying recognition of it. This also relates to an-
other feature of modern world: the existence of a plurality of values. The growing 
complexity of modern culture undermines the possible consensus about our val-
ues, generating, in the same time, more insecurity concerning identity4. The 20th 
century modernist view of man assumes, as a result of this growing complexity, 
something radical that Enlightenment or Romanticism would have rejected as 
pathological: the fact that our identity is defined as a multiple one often having in 
its texture conflictive dimensions5. 
Beside the influence of Romantic expressivism and Hegel’s philosophy, Tay-
lor is also indebted to phenomenology: Husserl emphasizes, as a fundamental fea-
ture of human mind, intentionality and related to it the ”life-world” we inhabit (a 
life-world close to a cultural understanding, rather than a naturalist one)6. Hei-
degger takes some of Husserl’s ideas and places them radically in a historical ho-
rizon: we are, according to Heidegger’s story, beings living in a socio-historical 
world and having a language that clarifies our basic cultural background incorpo-
rated in our ordinary practices. Taylor is also impressed by the French phenome-
nologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty especially because of his concern for our body, 
and also, in a more significant manner, by the German philosopher (Heidegger’s 
disciple) Hans Georg Gadamer. The hermeneutics developed by Gadamer, focus-
ing on language, dialogue, tradition, culture or the (slightly utopian) possibility of 
a ”fusion of horizons” (our different cultural interpretations can, through small 
steps of suspending our rigid cultural position, create a common ground for a 
consensual dialogue), allows Taylor to more convincingly reconstruct Hegel’s vi-
sion by rejecting his bombastic idea of an Absolute Spirit wandering the history 
and by keeping, in the same time, Hegel’s more valuable intuitions: the socio-cul-
tural nature of our identity, the need for recognition, the importance of language 
and so on7. 
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Conclusion. Hierarchy and Rhythm 
Surely, Taylor is not an author that agrees to some kind of value-free, dispas-
sionate stance regarding the tensions of the modern world, these frictions are not 
pure differences produced by a complex society and history that we simply must 
embrace or technically resolve without any kind of moral reaction to them. Con-
trary to his postmodernist or naturalist opponents, Taylor speaks about deep value 
crises, or ”malaises” that we must fight even though there is no final victory as-
sured in this matter. The major modern portrayals of the self hide, as we men-
tioned at the beginning of this text, some potential or actual crises closely inter-
twined: (a) the rationalist and instrumentalist description of the self leads, as Tay-
lor often mentions, in most cases to atomism in which individuals are freed from 
the deep community ties envisioning themselves as almost self-referential beings. 
The relative consensus around the Enlightenment’s idea of a universally distrib-
uted capacity of reasoning becomes often challenged when individual perspectives 
(worlds), following their specific interests, collide. Beside this abstract consensus 
there is no other external, more concrete reference to stop disengaged selves to en-
gage in cynical battles for supremacy and survival; (b) the Nietzschean and post-
modernist stories of the self also generate serious problems: the self ends up 
whether on the heights of creativity, totally disconnected from his community, or 
as a humble instrument of a difference-generating discourse. But the meaningless-
ness, the ego-loss of modern self remains, according to Taylor, unresolved as long 
as authenticity and expressivity is not connected to a cultural background; (c) fi-
nally, the communitarian description offers, in Taylor’s view, a better version, but 
a version always menaced, most visibly in Hegel’s case with his Absolute Spirit, by 
alienation and conformism. 
Taylor thinks we can fight these problems through a better definition of the 
self and also by a sustained effort of bringing to light those values that have deeply 
shaped our views of the self. As self-interpreting animal, the human being has a 
body and also the capacity of articulating, through language, a partial self-under-
standing. But this self-understanding makes sense only by relating it to a cultural 
background structured as a moral space: a human being is a strong evaluator al-
ways considering some things (offered by its background) more important than 
others. But we think that at this point, tensions arise: Taylor is vulnerable to pow-
erful critics because of his seemingly inconsistent story about the relation between 
strong values, on one hand, and tolerance, on the other1. Let us have a closer look 
on this matter. Taylor’s major problem concerning the self is a very old one, origi-
nating in Aristotle: how can we bring the diversity of goods under the unity of a 
life2. This problem becomes more urgent in modern world: Taylor tells us that we, 
contrary to our predecessors, are living in a society with an extended ”social imagi-
nary” defined by a plurality of values often conflictive each other. The old hierar-
chical world with one strong value (usually God) (more or less) harmoniously in-
cluding the others seems entirely gone. Aristotle solved, for example, the tension 
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between unity and difference through a hierarchy originating in external universe: 
some faculties (i.e., reason) are more important than others because there is a cos-
mological order mirroring in ourselves. But we, as moderns, cannot simply adopt 
the same model because we would reject equality or democracy as basic value de-
fining us and also we would question the process of individuation so deeply 
rooted in our culture. We believe that Taylor is actually in a very unpleasant posi-
tion because, on one hand, he says: human beings are strong evaluators both finding 
and creating hierarchical orders by considering some things more important than 
others; on the other hand, Taylor is aware that this basic (almost universal) feature of 
the human being is put to the test by a modernity that brings a plurality of values 
passionately rejecting hierarchy. What is the solution? We argue in fact that Taylor 
tries to replace the old rigid hierarchical model with a more flexible one (still hav-
ing its tensions) that we would like to call rhythmic. There are several aspects, we 
think, that prove this replacement: 
a) Even though he is highly suspicious about the image of a disengaged self 
who suspended everything around him in order to discover its neutral conscious-
ness, Taylor thinks there is still a way in which we can radically suspend our val-
ues without nevertheless ending up in a meta-language (as naturalism does). 
”In re-evaluations the most basic terms, those in which other evalua-
tions are carried on, are precisely what is in question. It is just because all for-
mulations are potentially under suspicion of distorting their objects that we 
have to see them all as revisable, that we are forced back, as it were, to the in-
articulate limit from which they originate”1. 
This procedure is related to our basic quality as the only beings having sec-
ond-order volitions. We can radically revise our values because we can question 
them. We think that one of Taylor’s inconsistencies lies exactly in this point: he 
tells us that second-order volitions that make possible radical re-evaluation are a ba-
sic feature of being human but, in the same time, he implicitly admits that this 
process of re-evaluation is a predominantly modern phenomenon2. We question 
our values because we are more insecure about them than our forebears. Taylor 
would argue saying that re-evaluation is in fact always present but is brought to 
light (made explicit) in times of crises (as in modernity). Anyway, the important 
thing is for us to notice that radical re-evaluation rejects a rigid hierarchy, empha-
sizing revisability and change in our value-system. 
b) Another feature that, according to us, proves the switch from a rigid hierar-
chy to a soft, rhythmic one is originated in the way Taylor understands expressiv-
ist tradition: by accepting Aristotle’s philosophical pattern of something potential 
that comes to light according to its telos, the Romantics reject, in the same time, the 
idea of a preexistent form, the final product is not something inscribed in external 
order, but is the result of the expressive effort of an individual. Hierarchies are not 
so much external, but internal. Cultures create only a value-horizon, but the indi-
vidual has the responsibility to recombine the values according to its personal 
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needs1. If the Romantics still believe in the unity of man, nature and society, Mod-
ernists preserve the idea of a balance between personal and transpersonal rejecting, 
in the same time, the vision of a possible unity: 
”’The Modernists’ multileveled consciousness is thus frequently ’decen-
tred’: aware of living on a transpersonal rhythm which is mutually irreduci-
ble in relation to the personal. But for all that it remains inward; and is the 
first only through being the second. The two features are inseparable”2. 
c) Taylor is also well aware that the complexity of the modern world requires 
a multiple identity of the self. Talking about Modernists, Taylor notices that they al-
ready developed this ”awareness of living on a duality or plurality of levels, not 
totally compatible, but which can’t be reduced to unity”3. Taylor’s version follows 
mostly the same path: he believes, for example, that multiculturalism is possible 
only if we accept the idea of a ”deep diversity” opened towards both collective and 
individual rights by promoting both tolerance and commonality4. This is also the 
reason why Taylor, despite his religious background, believes that the democratic 
ideal of tolerance comes first. (Nevertheless, he tries to connect religion and de-
mocratic tolerance by using the Christian value of ”agapē”, or charity based on 
God’s love for human beings5.) Moreover, the nature of a free society is not the 
state of freezing in some kind of order, but rather the ”lotta continua” meaning the 
fight between the higher and lower forms of liberty, no part ever being able to 
wholly destroy the other part6. 
d) Taylor also believes, bringing a final argument for a more rhythmic vision, 
that ideals, despite their absolute requirements, can be limited in their (self)-de-
structive tendency by only admitting their inevitably partial actualization. Ideals 
are cultural and historical products. There is no absolute transparency, but only a 
relative capacity to make things more clear than before. 
Having all these in mind, we can say that Taylor’s formula of personal identity 
is, despite the basic need for hierarchy coming from evaluation, not something fro-
zen, but rather a flexible hierarchy of values sensitive to the differences introduced 
by contexts. Perhaps communitarians are somehow right that we can still learn 
something from Aristotle: defining phronesis (practical reason) the ancient philoso-
pher was careful enough to say that this reason does not mean a doctrine that we 
literally have to follow regardless the situations, but rather a kind of wisdom flexi-
bly adapting itself to the never wholly predictable social contexts7. 
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